The Rational Constraint Condition prevents an infinite regress of representings standing in relation to other representings as a means of justifying the relation between representing and represented or thing in itself. The Rational Constraint Condition (RCC) is the pragmatic force (i.e., beyond the semantic) that says/shows—makes explicit—the relation between representings and representeds; “representings are responsible to what they represent.” That is, the RCC permits a represented to exercise “a distinctive kind of authority over representings” without infinite regress between the latter.
The rational constraint condition comes by way of reciprocal recognition between individuals, where inferences are drawn “by individuals practically taking or treating one another as authoritative and (so) responsible.” One holds another accountable for her claim via pragmatic metavocabularies that define what one must DO in order to count as SAYING something, and what one must SAY in order to count as DOING something.
My interest in Brandom’s brilliant work is twofold:
(1) to consider the role of informational and communication technologies in this inferential relation as there would seem to be some amplification of the inferential act, of meaning-making, via inferences drawn across, say, social media in real-time and through time—counterfactually—where assessments give new normative status to past contingencies or prior conceptual contents.
(2) Brandom’s reading of Hegelian (and Sellarian) inferentialism would seem to provide a narrow epistemology undeveloped in materialist accounts of meaning, specifically Marx’s. This epistemology would show, for example, financialization’s normative status, why one believes one ought to engage in risk beyond the material necessity of having to do so.